When Dodgers general manager Ned Colletti acquired Royals shortstop Angel Berroa from the Kansas City Royals for a prospect last week, the move was heralded as a risk at best, a boneheaded move at worst. In his week wearing Dodger blue, Berroa has lived up (or down) to his expectations: Considered a replacement over the offensively challenged Chin-Lung Hu, Berroa is hitting a scorching .167 with two singles, a double, a walk and four strikeouts, with no RBIs. And, a bonus: it was acknowledged that acquiring Berroa’s, um, “offense,” the Dodgers would sacrifice defense at a premium infield position. Once again, Berroa did not disappoint, committing an error that led to three unearned runs. Hu, in case you were wondering, has yet to make an error in 22 games at shortstop.
All this has vindicated Colletti as the bonehead he was made out to be. This is just the latest in his bumbling reign as Dodgers GM. His mistakes are many, as will be exhibited in the coming paragraphs. However, I hope it is not too late for him to learn, or at the very least, for the next (hopefully competent) Dodger GM to learn. That’s why I have compiled these Ten Commandments for General Managers. If these commandments are any indication, Colletti is one heck of a sinner. In reverse order:
X. Thy Shall Not Covet Thy Neighbor’s Players, nor Trade with Thy Neighbor.
Example: Acquiring Mark Sweeney from San Francisco; Letting Greg Maddux and Randy Wolf walk to San Diego.
Why would you ever want to help a rival? Division rivals on rare occasion, but never ever a nemesis. The Yankees and Red Sox don’t trade, nor do Cubs and Cardinals or Mets and Phillies or Marlins and Rays (I think). Of course, Colletti consummated the first Dodgers-Giants trade in 22 years, when the Dodgers got catcher Alex Trevino in exchange for outfielder Candy Maldonado. Looking back, I am convinced that this happened either because both GMs were drunk or wanted to cause a riot among their respective fan bases. Of course, no one cares about a trade featuring a guy named Candy, but I digress.
Anyhoo, Sweeney, with the second-most pinch hits all-time, naturally left his heart, along with his bat-speed, in San Francisco. Awesome. As Colletti learned, those who don’t learn from a Candy’d history are doomed to repeat it. Chalk this trade up there with ones that no one will remember. That’d be the best-case scenario; worst case is that keeping Sweeney and his non-existent bat on the bench will come back to cost the Dodgers in some way. Stay tuned to see how this one turns out.
A corollary of this rule is trying to prevent players from signing with rivals, as Greg Maddux and Randy Wolf defected from the Dodgers to San Diego and immediately began pitching well while the Dodgers pitching reverted to fecal matter. While it is not technically possible to prevent free agents from doing so, a team should make efforts to not let this happen, especially for a guy of Maddux’s caliber. As for Sweeney, what can I say? He’s admirably stepped into Olmedo Saenz’s size EEEE shoes as the slow first baseman who doesn’t hit when given the chance, even on rare occasions as DH.
Still, we can’t expect Colletti to totally understand this commandment; this is the guy who defected from San Francisco, after all.
IX. Thy Shalt Spendest Wisely.
Examples: $45 over five years for Juan Pierre; $36 million over two years for Andruw Jones.
The Dodgers are the prime example of why a team with a massive wallet can’t win. They pour tens of millions of dollars into guys who simply aren’t worth tens of millions of dollars. Colletti wasn’t around for this, but remember Darren Dreifort and Kevin Brown? Now, I don’t feel that baseball players deserve all these millions of dollars to begin with, but if the market dictates that a team has to shell out large sums of cash in order to stay competitive, then the team should invest wisely. The Dodgers are going to have to pay guys like Russell Martin, James Loney and Clayton Kershaw at some point, so why waste money of guys like Pierre and Andruw Jones?
If you’re going to give someone a huge contract, make sure the player is going to earn that money. A-Rod, yes. A-Berroa, no. And if you’re paying big bucks for many years, make sure that the player is going to be around to earn it. Speaking of which…
VIII. Thou Shalt Not Give Many a-Sheqel to Players who hast Lost an Eye, a Tooth, or 15 mph on his Fastball.
Examples: Signing Jason Schmidt from the Giants for three years and $47 million; signing Nomar Garciaparra for two years and $10 million.
Although Schmidt’s signing also counts as a violation of the tenth commandment, we’re filing it here to reflect Schmidt’s injury-plagued existence on the Dodgers. The Dodgers acquired Schmidt as a free agent before the 2007 season, despite whispers that he had lost some velocity in his last year with the Giants. Last year, as supposed ace of the staff, Schmidt pitched six games. He posted an ERA over six, recording as many wins (one) as homers before succumbing to a variety of injuries. He has yet to pitch this year.
Nomar’s signing was somewhat more excusable, as the market had few quality bats and the Dodgers lacked a, um, “power”-hitting infielder. Nevertheless, Nomar has contributed little since his big homer against the Padres in 2006. The Dodgers consider Garciaparra to be a versatile defender, which is true in that he is a suspect fielder wherever they have tried him on the infield. Additionally, Nomar has never regained the swagger or hitting ability that made him the popular former-franchise player in Boston.
VII. Thy Shalt Not Sign Another Team’s Refuse.
Examples: Signing Brett Tomko; Acquiring Mark Hendrickson from Tampa Bay and Wilson Betemit from Atlanta.
These three players merit their own column about their being, as I call them, the Unholy Trinity. But it’s worth mentioning that in baseball, one team’s trash is another team’s… trash. Tomko went 8-15 with a 4.48 ERA in 2005, but the Dodgers still felt it was worth their while to sign him. He had a mediocre 2006 before bottoming out in 2007 with a 2-11 record and a 5.80 ERA, complaining about not getting a chance to pitch while serving as what I call “comic relief.” Fittingly, he played for the atrocious Kansas City Royals this year. My only regret is that he was designated for assignments before recording his 100th loss (he’s stuck at 95-99).
Hendrickson, the 6-10 behemoth who should’ve stuck with the NBA, was 4-8 with the Devil Rays in 2006 before being traded to the Dodgers and posting a 2-7 record in the middle of a pennant race. At least he was consistent, posting a 4-8 record in 2007 before being released. Betemit was acquired in 2006 to stabilize the black hole at third base created by Adrian Beltre’s departure, and posted a .236 average with 19 homers and 50 RBIs over a season and a half. Fittingly, Colletti used Betemit to violate this commandment twice: He acquired Atlanta’s trash for trash of his own in reliever Danys Baez and infielder Willy Aybar, and then shipped Betemit to New York for the Yankees’ trash of their own, relieve Scott Proctor. So, to recap, the Dodgers' trading turned a shaky reliever and a mediocre prospect into... a shaky reliever. Good deal.
VI. Thy Shalt Be Wary when Trading with a Team that is Consistently Worse than Thine Own.
Examples: Acquiring Berroa from the Royals, Colletti’s three trades with Tampa Bay (Edwin Jackson for Baez, Dioner Navarro for Hendrickson, Joel Guzman for Julio Lugo).
The logic here is pretty simple: Why would you want to get parts from a team that has shown no real ability to identify and develop talent? Of course, it was possible that the other side was making a mistake and that Colletti was trying to capitalize on it— but then again, maybe not. While Tampa Bay is making strides to remove themselves from this list, the Royals are still very much on it. Be careful when acquiring players from the disaster called K.C., home to the Berroas, Tomkos, Jose Limas of the world. This is the ultimate refuse heap. Other franchises that currently fit the bill are Baltimore, Washington, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh and Texas.
On the flip side to this commandment is…
V. Thy Shalt Be Exceedingly Wary when Trading with a Team that is Consistently Better than Thine Own.
Examples: Acquiring Betemit from Atlanta; trading Betemit to the Yankees; signing Esteban Loaiza from Oakland.
The reasoning behind this commandment is also pretty simple: Teams that are consistently good have smart, attentive and, especially, competent general managers. It’s no accident that teams like the Yankees, Braves and A’s are consistently good. Even though Brian Cashman, John Schuerholz (now reitred) and Billy Beane have different styles and different budgets, they all still remain competitive.Do these names sound familiar? They are all the architects of winners. In fact, better make that a subcommandment: if you can name the GM and he is known to be a winner, he probably knows what he’s doing and you should watch what you trade. Can’t name the GM of the Astros? Go ahead. Know that the GM of the Red Sox is Theo Epstein? Proceed with caution.
Anyway, two thumbs way down for the Loaiza deal; even though he was released by Beane, who seems to intuit when players are done, Colletti signed him for the end of the 2007 season, just in time for Loaiza to help push the Dodgers’ playoff hopes down the drain. This season, he was made the fifth starter over Chan-Ho Park, who had a better spring training, on account of his contract. Of course, the Dodgers then released him this year because (a) he was pitching poorly and (b) they wanted to make room for Clayton Kershaw. Serves Colletti right for picking up what even Billy Beane, master of the bargain deals, couldn’t use.
IV. Remember the Farm System and Keep it Holy.
Examples: Holding on to James Loney, Russell Martin, Clayton Kershaw, Jonathan Broxton, Matt Kemp, Andre Ethier, Blake DeWitt, Andy LaRoche, Chad Billingsley and Scott Elbert; trading Joel Guzman, Edwin Jackson and Dioner Navarro.
You have to give credit where credit is due, and Colletti has stuck to his guns of not giving up his prized prospects. He hasn’t built a winning team yet, but there’s still hope, assuming these prospects develop into a winning core and that Colletti does minor tinkering at most.
Colletti also has proven to be wise, or perhaps fortunate, in that all the prospects he has traded away, such as Guzman and Jackson, haven’t developed into stars or come back to hurt the Dodgers.
III. Thy Shalt Fear the Contract Year.
Example: Signing Andruw Jones.
A word of explanation: A GM should always be careful when signing guys who put up great numbers in the last year of their contract, hoping to impress teams to the point of ponying up a multiyear, multimillion-dollar contract. Upon getting these contracts the said players promptly do one of three things: (a) they become out of shape, (b) they become injured, usually as a result of being out of shape, and (c) they simply stop trying. In all cases, the player fails to produce up to the standards of the illusion that was the contract year. One can see why it would be wise to stay away from such players, and to avoid giving them franchise money at all costs.
Colletti so far has managed to avoid the prototypical contract year player. However, he has managed to perfect the art of signing the anti-contract year player. The anti-contract player is one who puts up numbers that are suspiciously below his career averages, but who somehow gets signed to a mega-deal that leaves even the dumbest monkeys scratching their heads. Take Jones, who in 2007 put up his worst numbers in years: .222 average, .311 OBP, .413 SLG, 26 HR, 94 RBI, 83 R, 127 H and 138 K. That’s a lot of drop-off from his previous years in Atlanta. Although he was damaged goods (VIII), not wanted by his former team (VII) and cast off by a competent GM (V) , Colletti deemed it wise to take a two-year flier on a player whose agent promised he’d be better after an injury-plagued 2007.
Now, what exactly is a two-year flier? Signing an injury-plagued Nomar for two years and $10 million is a flier, albeit a risky one. But signing Jones of $36 million? Making him the fifth-highest paid player in baseball? Just to review the numbers this year for Jones: 43 games, .165 average, 2 HR, and a K:BB ratio better than 2 to 1. The guys ahead of him on that list? A-Rod, Manny, Jeter, and Carlos Zambrano. The only guy in the top ten who’s less deserving of his contract is Barry Zito, who checks in seventh.
Speaking of Jones, A-Rod and Zito, know what they have in common? That’s right, it’s none other than…
II. Thou Shalt Not Tempt the Satan.
Examples: Signing Andruw Jones and Jason Schmidt
GMs everywhere should take great care when dealing with Satan, aka superagent Scott Boras. Of the top ten free agents on the list mentioned above, Boras is probably responsible for between seven and ten of them. Thanks to him, the Dodgers are shelling out the big bucks to Jones and Schmidt, and look at what that’s got ‘em.
An intriguing side note to the Dodgers-Boras relationship: Dodgers rightfielder J.D. Drew had indicated he was going to return to the team after the 2006 season. However, undoubtedly urged on by Boras, Drew exercised the opt-out clause in his contract, leaving the last three years (and $33 million) on the table. Drew then signed for five years and $70 million with the Red Sox. Colletti, caught off-guard, was surprised, angry and probably a little hurt. He probably vowed by the hairs of his magnificent mustache never to trust Scott Boras again, and you know what happened next.
This just goes to show that the most important commandment of all is this:
I. Thou Shalt Use Common Sense.
Really, it’s not that difficult. If everyone is going to skewer you for it, you’d probably better not do it. It’s better to make moves that are low-risk, high-reward than those that are high-risk, high salary. As a prime example, did you notice how many times Jason Schmidt and Andruw Jones are on this list of examples? Maybe hindsight is 20-20, at least for Schmidt, but can you name one person not named Boras who liked the Jones signing?
Common sense is trying to think and act wisely, which is where Colletti is perhaps the biggest sinner. It’s not about giving out stupid contracts, or bringing in contract cancers, or hiring managers who choked away Game 7 of the 2003 ALCS. It’s about keeping faith in the prospects, finding ways to spend wisely, valuing character and pitching and defense and leadership, and making small trades that turn out to be bigger than anyone thought. It’s about trying to see things so obvious that an eight-year-old kid could see it. It’s about being accountable and honest and doing your best and not trying to cover up mistakes with money. Ned Colletti has made more than his shares of mistakes, but I am hopeful that he’ll be able to right the ship.
I realize that while these Ten Commandments express many of the Don’ts of trading, there aren’t many Dos. Whom can the Dodgers trade with? The answers: The Dodgers are allowed to trade with teams holding a fire sale at the trade deadline; with most AL teams; with most NL East and NL Central teams; occasionally with NL West teams; they can trade surplus at one position for players at a position where they are severely lacking. However, in contrast to the above, these are merely guidelines; the most important commandment for how to conduct trades is Number I.
Keywords: Andruw Jones, Jason Schmidt, Los Angeles Dodgers, Ned Colletti, Nomar Garciaparra, Russell Martin, Scott Boras, Ten Commandments
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